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Introduction:  
Climate Crisis?  
What Climate Crisis?
Steffen Böhm and Sian Sullivan
(At Least) Five Decades of Knowing and (Not) Acting1
In all the talk about the Paris Agreement, reached at the twenty-first 
Conference of Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, it is sometimes forgotten 
that the world’s political leaders have held negotiations about climate 
change at the highest possible level for at least three decades. Many have 
known about climate change for a lot longer. 
It was in the 1860s that the Irish scientist John Tyndall first established 
a link between CO2 and what then became known as the ‘greenhouse 
effect’, which was further evidenced by the Swedish scientist Svante 
Arrhenius (Pain 2009). In 1938, the British scientist and engineer 
Guy Stewart Callendar “documented a significant upward trend in 
temperatures for the first four decades of the 20th century and noted 
the systematic retreat of glaciers” (Plass et al. 2010: online). In 1956, 
the American scientist Gilbert Plass (1956) published a seminal paper 
called ‘Carbon Dioxide Theory of Climatic Change’, creating a clear link 
between increases in the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere and 
global temperature rises. 
1  The first part of this introduction draws on an earlier blog article by Böhm, published 
as ‘The Paris Climate Talks and other Events of Carbon Fetishism’, https://www.
versobooks.com/blogs/2372-steffen-bohm-the-paris-climate-talks-and-other-
events-of-carbon-fetishism. 
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This scientific knowledge has thus been ‘out there’ for a very long 
time, and was also not unnoticed in the political arena. As early as 1965, 
the US President’s Science Advisory Committee 
told President Lyndon Johnson that greenhouse warming was a matter of 
real concern. There could be ‘marked changes in climate,’ they reported, 
‘not controllable through local or even national efforts.’ CO2 needed 
attention as a possibly dangerous ‘pollutant’ (Weart 2021: online). 
In the ‘mother country’ of fossil fuel burning, the United Kingdom, 
politicians became increasingly aware of climate change in the 1960s. In 
1969, the House of Lords (the upper chamber in the UK parliamentary 
system) discussed railway policy and the hereditary peer Jestyn Philipps 
asked the following question: 
[m]y Lords, can my noble friend say whether he and British Railways 
have taken account of the fact that what were abnormal temperatures last 
summer may not be abnormal if we continue to discharge CO2 into the 
air by the burning of various fossil carbons, so increasing the greenhouse 
effect? (Carbon Brief 2019a: online). 
Public opinion, particularly in the highly industrialised, most polluting 
countries, had shifted markedly towards an awareness of environmental 
issues in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1962, Rachel Carson’s influential and 
path-breaking book, Silent Spring, was published, becoming a bestseller 
worldwide. Anti-pollution, conservation and environmental protection 
movements sprang up everywhere. The first ‘Earth Day’ was held in 
the United States in 1970, becoming global in 1990 and marking the 
emergence of environmentalism as a serious social movement and 
political force (as also discussed by Hulme, this volume).2 The world’s 
first green political parties were founded in 1972, in the Australian state 
of Tasmania and in New Zealand. The German Green Party, which 
subsequently became one of the most successful national green parties 
worldwide, was founded in 1979. Climate change was written on the 
banners of these environmental activists from the start.
The rise of environmental consciousness from the 1960s onwards also 
made the bosses of fossil fuel companies take note. We now know that 
the corporate leaders of ExxonMobil, one of the biggest oil companies of 
the world, had known about climate change and the unsustainability of 
2  See https://www.earthday.org/history/. 
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their business models since at least 1977 (Hall 2015), as also clarified by 
Wright and Nyberg, this volume. During the 1980s, Exxon and Shell had 
extensive internal discussions and memos on climate change (Franta 
2018). We are constantly told that companies are always listening to what 
their customers want. Well, already in the 1970s it became clear that an 
increasing number of customers were worried about the degradation of 
nature and climate change in particular. Corporate leaders would have 
been aware of this shift in public consciousness and attention. Given that 
what companies hate most are business risks, and that climate change is 
the biggest risk to an oil and gas company’s business model, it would be 
logical to assume that these companies were making climate change risk 
assessments from these decades.
The 1980s saw the rapid expansion of environmentalism worldwide. 
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) published Our Common Future, which became known as the 
‘Brundtland Report’, named after the Commission’s chairwoman Gro 
Harlem Brundtland. While the Report had a wider remit, focusing on a 
whole range of environmental issues, it clearly stated that there is 
the serious probability of climate change generated by the ‘greenhouse 
effect’ of gases emitted to the atmosphere, the most important of which 
is carbon dioxide (CO2) produced from the combustion of fossil fuels 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 145–46). 
It went on to say:
[a]fter reviewing the latest evidence on the greenhouse effect in October 
1985 at a meeting in Villach, Austria, organized by the WMO, UNEP, 
and ICSU, scientists from 29 industrialized and developing countries 
concluded that climate change must be considered a ‘plausible and 
serious probability’ [...] They estimated that if present trends continue, 
the combined concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere would be equivalent to a doubling of CO2 from pre-
industrial levels, possibly as early as the 2030s, and could lead to a rise 
in global mean temperatures ‘greater than any in man’s [sic] history’. 
Current modelling studies and ‘experiments’ show a rise in globally 
averaged surface temperatures, for an effective CO2 doubling, of 
somewhere between 1.5°C and 4.5°C, with the warming becoming more 
pronounced at higher latitudes during winter than at the equator […]. 
An important concern is that a global temperature rise of 1.5–4.5°C, with 
perhaps a two to three times greater warming at the poles, would lead 
to a sea level rise of 25–140 centimetres. A rise in the upper part of this 
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range would inundate low-lying coastal cities and agricultural areas, 
and many countries could expect their economic, social, and political 
structures to be severely disrupted (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987: 148).
The Brundtland Report and the continued gathering of scientific 
evidence catapulted climate change to the top of the political agenda 
of many countries at the end of the 1980s. On 23 June 1988—more than 
thirty years ago!—Dr James Hansen, then director of NASA’s Institute 
for Space Studies, stated in a landmark testimony before the US Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, that 
[g]lobal warming has reached a level such that we can ascribe with a 
high degree of confidence a cause-and-effect relationship between 
the greenhouse effect and observed warming…In my opinion, the 
greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing our climate now 
(Brulle 2018: online). 
Climate change was no longer only a concern for tree-hugging 
activists—if it ever was confined in that way. Now, NASA scientists and 
the top political class in the richest countries of the world were not only 
informed about climate change but were actively talking about what to 
do about it. 
This recognition of the urgency of climate change, and the high 
risk of not doing anything to turn it around or address its predicted 
impacts, contributed to the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit (Rio Summit) 
in 1992, which brought together leaders from government, business 
and NGOs from across the world, including most heads of state. At the 
Rio Summit, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—an official, international environmental treaty 
with binding obligations—was signed, coming into force in 1994. 
The so-called Conference of the Parties (COP) is the UNFCCC’s 
main decision-making body and meets annually. At COP3 in 1997, the 
Kyoto Protocol was signed, the first international agreement to curb 
global greenhouse gas emissions. At COP21, in 2015, the landmark Paris 
Agreement was reached to commit states across the world to keep global 
warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius. 
Alongside these agreements under the UNFCCC, the United 
Nations has also included ‘Climate Action’ as one of seventeen global 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015, framing 
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SDG13 specifically as a call that governments “[t]ake urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts”.3 
Having arrived at 2021, however, scientific evidence for ongoing 
global temperature rises alongside industrial combustion of fossil 
fuels is now overwhelming. The simple graphic shown in Figure 1 
communicates clearly where we are in terms of global temperature rises 
since 1850.
Fig. 1. Annual average temperatures for the world, 1850–2020, based on data by 
the UK Met Office, Graphics and lead scientist Ed Hawkins, National Centre 
for Atmospheric Science, University of Reading. Creative Commons, https://
showyourstripes.info/. 
Climate scientists now agree 
that 2011–2020 was the warmest decade on record, in a persistent long-
term climate change trend. The warmest six years have all been since 
2015, with 2016, 2019 and 2020 being the top three. The differences in 
average global temperatures among the three warmest years—2016, 2019 
and 2020—are indistinguishably small. The average global temperature 
in 2020 was about 14.9°C, 1.2 (± 0.1) °C above the pre-industrial (1850–
1900) level (WMO 2021: online). 
In other words, we have already seen a 1.2 degrees Celsius temperature 
rise globally, which makes it all but certain that we will fail to meet the 
3  See https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change/. 
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1.5 degrees commitment made by the UNFCCC’s COP21 in Paris in 2015 
– as confirmed in the recently published first instalment of the Sixth 
Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2021). If current trends persist, and even if countries 
meet their Paris Agreement obligations, many climate scientists now 
warn that we are heading towards at least 3 degrees Celsius change 
compared to pre-industrial levels (UN 2019). 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities?
The UNFCCC treaty agreed in Rio in 1992 clearly acknowledged that 
the rich, highly developed and industrialised countries have a historical 
responsibility to take a lead in combating climate change, given that 
countries such as the UK, the US, France, Germany, etc. have been 
pumping greenhouse gases at scale into the atmosphere for at least 
three hundred years. The treaty says in Article 3, Principle 1:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof (UN 1992: 9).
The Kyoto Protocol, the first landmark, international agreement to commit 
to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reductions, repeated this commitment:
[a]ll Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances (UN 1998: 9).
The key phrase here is ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, 
acknowledging that climate change is a global ‘commons’ problem (as 
further discussed in Lankford’s chapter, this volume), but that different 
countries have different responsibilities in relation to their contributions 
to this problem. Carbon emissions do not respect national borders: if 
a large, coal-fired power station is built in one country, it ultimately 
affects the climate on the whole planet. In saying that responsibilities 
are ‘differentiated’, Global South countries are acknowledged to have 
not been the cause of climate change, and to have not emitted massive 
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amounts of GHG for very long, with the inference that they cannot be 
expected to sort out the mess that Global North countries—the rich, 
industrialised nations with their expansionary colonising histories—
have caused. 
A glance at global history reveals how closely energy and GHG 
emissions have been linked to both economic growth and colonial 
expansion. The Netherlands was the first country to develop a taste for 
exponential industrial growth back in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, which would have been unthinkable without the availability 
of cheap domestic peat, as well as timber from Norwegian and Baltic 
forests (Moore 2010). One reason that Britain took over Holland’s 
imperial leadership was due to its vast reserves of coal mined at great 
profit through the use of cheap labour, with the burning of coal taking 
off at the end of the eighteenth century, and growing exponentially in 
the nineteenth century (Malm 2016). Then came oil and gas, which have 
helped make the United States of America the global imperial master 
from the early twentieth century onwards (Foster 2006).
There is thus more than 250 years of fossil fuel burning by the Global 
North to account for. Many climate justice activists advocate for some 
form of reparations to be paid by the North to the poorest countries of the 
planet, particularly those that are already struggling to adapt to a rapidly 
changing climate, whether in the form of rising sea levels, increasing 
drought (as considered in the chapter by Lendelvo and colleagues, this 
volume), failed harvests, or bigger and more forceful weather events 
such as storms. The fact that approximately 80% of historical carbon 
emissions have to be attributed to the rich world (Centre for Global 
Development 2015), and are already causing havoc in many countries 
around the world, cannot simply be wished away.
In the Paris Agreement of 2015, ‘common and differentiated 
responsibilities’ were again mentioned repeatedly, for example in Article 
4, Paragraph 19:
[a]ll Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low 
greenhouse gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 
taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances 
(UN 2015: 6).
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Yet, this principle has gradually been pushed into the background, and 
the discourse of ‘differentiation’ is now almost a fringe occurrence. The 
rapid rises of emissions, particularly in China and India, are often cited 
as reasons for why these fast-industrialising countries now also have 
to curb their emissions. Clearly, they have their own responsibilities 
and they need to be held to account: China, in particular, is now the 
largest GHG emitter by far in the world. Let us bear in mind, however, 
that India’s carbon emissions per capita are still about a seventh of the 
figure for the United States (Carbon Brief 2019b), and China’s rapidly 
rising emissions are to a great extent driven by export-driven industries, 
producing consumer goods for the rest of the world, particularly the 
Global North (Yang, Yuantao et al. 2020). If we add up historical per 
capita emissions over the past three hundred years, then China’s carbon 
emissions—with its vast population—lag far behind those countries 
that industrialised first (Centre for Global Development 2015).
Western European countries like to portray themselves in green, 
responsible colours, highlighting that their carbon emissions are 
significantly lower than the Kyoto baseline of 1990. The UK, for 
example, which is hosting COP26 in Glasgow in 2021,4 frequently and 
happily declares that “[i]n 2019, total UK greenhouse gas emissions 
were provisionally 45.2 per cent lower than in 1990” (Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2020). What is conveniently 
forgotten is that the UK’s apparent success in lowering GHG emissions 
is largely due to the early adoption of gas, which has lower emissions 
than coal and oil, in the early 1990s, i.e. before Kyoto. There are 
clearly carbon reduction successes in many Global North countries. 
The power generation sector in the UK, for example, has now phased 
out coal almost completely,5 which, only four to five decades ago, 
would have been unthinkable. Renewable energy adoption rates are 
high in countries such as Germany. Global North governments have 
made efforts to put their countries on a decisive decarbonisation path 
with the UK being the first country to legislate for a net zero carbon 
emissions commitment by 2050. The UK’s Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) claims there are already signs that there has been a decoupling 
4  See https://ukcop26.org/. 
5  Strangely and controversially, however, the UK government is currently considering 
to approve the establishment of a new coal mine in Cumbria; see https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/explainers-56023895.
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of economic growth and GHG emissions in the country (Office for 
National Statistics 2019), apparently proving that the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve was right to predict that, as countries grow richer, 
their negative environmental impact will reduce (see, for example, 
Grossman and Krueger 1995). The ONS confirms that emissions 
peaked in 2007, and that the country is on the right path to meet its 
2050 net zero commitments. 
But there are four controversies that such statistics and resulting 
political posturing ignore or downplay.
First, most global GHG statistics are still based on the production 
principle: that is, carbon is counted in the countries where it is emitted 
(see discussion in Hannis’s chapter, this volume). Countries such as the 
UK, however, are net importers of carbon emissions, as the ONS report 
rightly points out (Office for National Statistics 2019). If a consumption-
based approach to carbon accounting is taken, the UK’s national carbon 
emissions would be significantly higher than officially reported. How 
much higher is subject to which carbon accounting technique is used. This 
is also true for most Western European countries as well as the United 
States, which have seen increasing rates of deindustrialisation over the 
last two decades with not only jobs but also carbon emissions being 
offshored to countries of the Global South. In return the Global North 
receives cheap consumer goods whose embedded carbon emissions are 
not attributed to itself. Of course, some of the exponential growth in 
carbon emissions by India and China is also due to increases in home-
grown consumption. China apparently now has the largest middle class 
in the world. If we take a consumption-based view, however, then even 
China’s emissions per capita will not reach the US’s current rate for a 
long time. India lags even further behind.
Second, there are three large sectors that are mostly and conveniently 
ignored by any carbon accounting techniques: the military, shipping 
and aviation. As Bigger et al. report in this volume, the US military 
‘bootprint’ is higher than many middle-income countries. Calculating 
the carbon footprint of global military operations is nearly impossible, 
however, as governments do not report details of military fuel 
consumption, emissions and impacts. Some analysts estimate that 
the global ‘bootprint’ of the military could be as high as 6% of 
global emissions (Scientists for Global Responsibility 2020): bigger 
than Russia’s entire share in 2019. The global shipping and aviation 
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industries have also repeatedly evaded their climate responsibilities, 
given that their operations transgress national boundaries. Ships 
mostly operate outside national jurisdictions, and again an effective 
calculation of their carbon footprint is difficult. Estimates exist that put 
shipping and aviation on a combined 5.39% of global GHG emissions 
(Ritchie 2020; Saul 2020)—higher than the GHG emissions of high 
emitting countries such as Russia—and both global shipping and 
aviation emissions are rising fast.
The third area often conveniently forgotten in any national carbon 
accounting scheme concerns the financing of fossil fuel infrastructure. 
Large fossil fuel projects, such as the development of new oil and gas 
fields, or the building of pipelines and dams, requires finance that even 
national governments cannot muster. The largest banks of the world are 
also the largest financiers of fossil fuel developments. The Banking on 
Climate Chaos Report 2021 (Rainforest Action Network 2021) showed 
that the world’s biggest sixty banks have provided $3.8tn of financing 
for fossil fuel developments, since the Paris Agreement was signed in 
2015. JP Morgan Chase, which tops the table, has provided more than 
$300bn of finance alone. These global finance streams again distort the 
national pictures of GHG emissions. Without such finance, oil fields 
could not be developed nor coal-fired power stations built. But which 
country should be responsible and accountable for the carbon emissions 
caused by these new fossil fuel developments? These banks, which are 
normally headquartered in Global North countries, profit from these 
projects, creating economic growth activities in the countries they are 
based in and demonstrating the significant continuing global influence 
of the fossil fuel industry (as emphasised in Wright and Nyberg’s 
chapter, this volume). 
Fourth, but by no means least, we need to account for the fast-
rising emissions associated with so-called ‘green’ industries, such as 
renewable energy. Biomass-burning power stations, such as the UK’s 
Drax, electric vehicles, industrial-scale wind parks, large solar farms, 
nuclear power stations—these are all sold as ‘low-carbon’ solutions 
to the planet’s climate change malaise. Yet, if the GHG emissions of 
the entire life cycle of these technologies are taken into account, their 
carbon footprint is significant, particularly in the context of their fast 
adoption around the world, not to mention their often-forgotten, grave 
social implications (Sullivan 2013a; Ramirez and Böhm 2021). Dunlap’s 
chapter, this volume, thus proposes that industrial-scale renewable 
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energy production should more accurately be labelled as ‘Fossil Fuel+’ 
to acknowledge the continued product-cycle dependence of these 
technologies on fossil-fuel based sources of energy.
Does the Environmental Kuznets Curve, i.e. the suggestion that 
beyond a certain degree of economic growth a society will reduce its 
environmental impacts, account for these four areas of contention? Are 
the rich, Global North countries really on a path of decarbonisation? 
Deepening the intractability of reducing CO2 emissions whilst 
simultaneously maintaining an industrial growth pathway is the 
greenwashing that accompanies renewable energy production on an 
industrial scale. Perhaps only a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 
which governments commit not to extract and exploit fossil fuels, will 
ultimately be the kind of governance mechanism that will prevent the 
exposure of the climate to future fossil fuel emissions—as proposed 
by Newell, this volume. On this point, it is encouraging to see a recent 
ruling by a Dutch court that oil giant Royal Dutch Shell must cut 45% of 
its 2019 greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 so as to contribute to national 
targets agreed under the Paris Agreement of COP21 (Farmer 2021). 
Meanwhile, however, all the global GHG emissions curves go in the 
wrong direction. 
Fig. 2. Annual total CO2 emissions, by world region, 1750–2019, Creative 
Commons, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co-emissions-by-region. 
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Three Decades of Carbon Fetishism
For three decades now, there has been talk and action on climate change 
at the highest possible levels—in politics, business, finance and civil 
society. For three decades, climate change has shaped the consciousness 
of citizens, consumers, politicians, entrepreneurs, farmers—and 
particularly those land-based communities directly affected by climate 
change (see chapters by Dieckmann, Lendelvo et al., and Sullivan this 
volume). We have seen the rise of climate justice movements, such as 
Extinction Rebellion (XR)6 and Fridays For Future7 (as discussed by 
Gardham, this volume). Swedish environmental activist Greta Thunberg, 
whose activism began as a school strike in protest against the very limited 
political action vis-à-vis climate change, has been catapulted into a global 
phenomenon, speaking in front of the UN Assembly and the European 
Parliament. David Attenborough, the famous UK-based conservationist 
and broadcaster, has become an outspoken climate activist, producing 
advocacy films on the dangers of climate change shown around the 
world on platforms such as Netflix. Thousands of parliaments, local 
government authorities and other large public organisations around the 
world have declared Climate Emergencies. Not a day goes by without a 
large company making ‘net zero’ commitments (although see Dyke et 
al. and Bailey this volume for more detail regarding the effectiveness or 
otherwise of net zero policies). 
Take, for example, the most recent, annual letter to the CEOs of 
companies invested in by BlackRock, the asset management company, 
written by Larry Fink, its founder, chairman and chief executive officer:
I believe that the pandemic has presented such an existential crisis—such 
a stark reminder of our fragility—that it has driven us to confront the 
global threat of climate change more forcefully and to consider how, like 
the pandemic, it will alter our lives (Fink 2021: online). 
Fink has committed BlackRock “to supporting the goal of net zero 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or sooner” (BlackRock 2021: online). 
While there is very little detail on how this goal is to be achieved, it 
6  https://extinctionrebellion.uk/. 
7  https://fridaysforfuture.org/. 
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nevertheless is remarkable for Fink to become a corporate ‘climate 
activist’ (Skoglund and Böhm 2020) in a country, the United States, 
where a significant proportion of the population still believes climate 
change is a hoax. His commitment is part of a wider trend in the finance 
industry that is now, apparently, taking environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria, such as climate change, very seriously (as 
also analysed by Kaplan and Levy, this volume). As the Financial Times 
says:
Investment in companies that integrate environmental, social and 
governance factors continues to gain traction across public and private 
markets. Once considered a niche, the zeitgeist has gone past the notion 
of a ‘seismic shift’. Instead, integration of ESG underpins most, if not 
all, debates about the future of the investment industry (Lampen 2021: 
online).
Sounds good, does it not? All this newly found commitment to tackle 
climate change as well as the wider environmental malaise we find 
ourselves in should be welcomed and celebrated. However, a heavy 
dose of scepticism and critical interrogation is also needed (as offered 
by Bracking, this volume), precisely because we have been here many 
times before. 
Our outline above suggests that capitalism (and state socialism, for 
that matter) does not have a good track record in terms of environmental 
performance. For decades now, it has failed to adequately address the 
climate crisis (Böhm et al. 2012). Whatever has been tried has not worked. 
Global GHG emissions are still rising exponentially—as clarified in 
Figure 2. Most analyses indicate that the global COVID-19 pandemic 
will only temporarily halt emissions, with a massive rebound looming. 
This was certainly the case in 2008/09 when the last global crisis meant 
that GHG reduced slightly in most countries, only to continue on their 
path of exponential growth soon after. 
Why is this? Why, despite all the talk and the good intentions by 
many, has the world not managed to reduce GHG emissions since the 
inception of the UNFCCC all those years ago? Why are emissions still 
rising fast? One answer lies in the carbon market instruments that have 
been invented over the past thirty years to deal with the climate crisis.
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Already at COP3 in Kyoto in 1997, the rich world, led by the US, 
demanded ‘flexibility’ in terms of how the highly industrialised 
countries should be allowed to deal with cutting their carbon emissions. 
This demand resulted in a proliferation of market mechanisms, which, 
in proper capitalist market fashion, work by establishing property 
rights for carbon emissions, allowing carbon permits and credits to be 
traded globally (Böhm and Dhabi 2011; Böhm et al. 2015). The ensuing 
creation and ‘primitive accumulation’ of carbon units led to a number of 
Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) being set up across the world, most 
prominently the EU-ETS, which came into force in 2005 (Lohmann 2009, 
2014). 
This market approach is in line with dominant neoliberal governance 
approaches that have been spearheaded by Anglo-Saxon countries, 
mainly the US and the UK, since the early 1980s, and which have since 
spread across the globe ultimately through finance conditionalities set by 
International Financial Institutions (Dunlap and Sullivan 2019). While 
states and their governments have not disappeared, the ideological 
approach by neoliberalism is to let market principles deal with most 
economic and increasingly social and environmental affairs, including 
climate change. But the success of ETSs around the world has been 
limited, to say the least, with only small percentage points of progress 
made towards reducing global GHG emissions. 
A recent paper argues that despite low carbon prices in the EU-ETS, 
this continent-wide carbon trading scheme was responsible for a 3.8% 
cut in total EU-wide emissions between 2008 and 2016 (Bayer and Aklin 
2020). This calculation can be challenged on various grounds, but even 
if such a reduction can be robustly attributed to the EU-ETS, such a 
modest success can hardly be a blueprint for the radical emissions cuts 
needed for any chance of limiting global climate chaos. Many academics, 
commentators and climate activists have argued that neoliberal, market-
based approaches have been nothing more than a delaying tactic, 
allowing the big polluting companies and countries to continue to emit 
carbon at a massive scale, while offsetting their responsibilities through 
clever carbon accounting techniques (Lippert 2014) and the fantasies of 
“green success” they sustain (Watt 2021). 
Carbon has now become a major commodity, traded on stock 
exchanges across the world. This financialisation of climate change 
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is creating new carbon elites, benefitting from the world’s quest to 
urgently curb global GHG emissions and seemingly decarbonise capital 
(Christophers 2019; Langley et al. 2021). Larry Fink and the other 
financiers now riding the ESG boom are sniffing gold. When he talks 
about “capturing opportunities created by the net zero transition” 
he has carbon pricing mechanisms in mind. Whilst these potentially 
financial(ising) instruments have been around since Kyoto in 1997, 
COP21 paved the way for a massive scaling up of voluntary trading of 
carbon units so as, again seemingly, to meet the urgent climate challenges 
facing global society today. For this reason, 
[a] host of top figures from business, finance and academia led by former 
Bank of England Governor Mark Carney have announced a global task 
force to accelerate the development of voluntary carbon markets across 
the private sector, ahead of anticipated surge in demand for CO2 offsets 
as the net zero transition gathers pace (Holder 2020: online).
Carney’s ‘taskforce’ aims for “scaling voluntary carbon markets and 
allowing a global price for carbon to emerge”, which is claimed will give 
companies the “right tools and incentives to reduce emissions at least 
cost” (ibid.). This new initiative conveniently ignores the problematic 
evidence and experience of operating carbon markets, and specifically 
voluntary offsetting schemes, over the past twenty years. 
When in 2009, in the run-up to the COP15 climate change talks in 
Copenhagen, we published the book Upsetting the Offset (Böhm and Dabhi 
2009), our intention was to show the negative and oft-ignored impacts 
of carbon offsetting on the ground in the Global South especially. Tamra 
Gilbertson (2009), for example, in her case of A. T. Biopower, showed 
how what used to be sustainable agricultural practices in Thailand were 
transformed into so-called carbon neutral operations that create profits 
and rents for local elites and international polluters, yet disadvantage 
local people and communities.
In 2014, one of us (Böhm) co-authored in the journal Carbon 
Management an analysis of evidence for ‘Ten reasons why carbon markets 
will not bring about radical emissions reduction’ (Pearse and Böhm 
2014). The article argued that carbon markets do not work because they 
provide plenty of loopholes for the biggest emitters, often going hand-
in-hand with a lack of political will to radically curb GHG emissions 
(see also Bryant et al. 2015). Lobbying by fossil fuel elites is rife and has 
xlviii Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
resulted in dinosaur industries actually benefiting from the introduction 
of carbon markets, and there have also been many cases of corruption. 
Despite their stated commitments to further sustainable development, 
carbon offsetting schemes, which are normally implemented in Global 
South countries, often involve a whole range of negative social and 
environmental ‘side-effects’ not accounted for when ‘net zero’ or ‘carbon 
neutral’ claims are made by investors in this new imaginary of “carbon 
earth” (Sullivan 2010: 113; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013; Asiyanbi 2017). 
Carbon markets can also be regressive in terms of disproportionately 
affecting low-income households. What the carbon market approach 
amounts to is an almost blind belief in market mechanisms to solve the 
climate chaos we find ourselves in. But these carbon mechanisms are so 
complicated, technocratic, and obscure that they are really designed for 
use by corporate and financial elites only. 
The reality and academic evidence presented in this 2014 paper has 
not changed. What has changed is that after almost ten years of bear 
climate markets, the new ESG activists, including Larry Fink, smell an 
opportunity. Whilst perhaps unintended, what the combined Greta 
Thunberg and David Attenborough effect has done is reignite the 
fantasy that carbon markets will solve climate chaos. Fink will always 
take BlackRock where the future money is. Carbon markets, in the guise 
of ‘net zero’ strategies, appear to offer this future.
Let us ask some questions in response. In the other, still ongoing, 
global crisis that is the COVID-19 pandemic, have governments around 
the world relied on markets to deal with the biggest health crisis the 
world has seen for a century? Have they created complicated COVID-
credits that can be traded on global stock exchanges to determine the 
most efficient way of combating the virus? Have they allowed COVID-
offsetting, so that some people or companies could buy themselves out 
of lockdown? No? No, they have not! (Although we note the increasing 
talk of creating and selling so-called ‘Covid bonds’––see Postel-Vinay 
2021). This is because there was no time. The pandemic was and is 
an emergency. Everybody had to go into lockdown, everybody was 
affected. The virus knew and knows no borders, and the countries that 
have most successfully dealt with the pandemic are those where there 
has been decisive government action. It is precisely this kind of political 
will that has been in short supply for combating climate change (as also 
observed by Halme and colleagues, this volume).
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Carbon offsetting and trading schemes will undoubtedly see 
unprecedented growth in the coming years, if ESG activists and 
politicians have their way. Companies and countries will continue to ask 
for maximum ‘flexibility’ in meeting their climate commitments, which 
is code for saying: they want to offset their emissions without cleaning 
up their act at home. 
What all this amounts to is what the critical geographer Erik 
Swyngedouw (2010) has called ‘CO2 fetishism’. For Swyngedouw, 
capitalism’s attempt to deal with the climate crisis is a perfect example 
of ‘post-politics’, generating a lot of talk about what needs to change 
to make our existence on earth sustainable without changing much 
at all. What is important to bear in mind, though, is that this talk 
about change is not all there is. Swyngedouw (2010) also argues that 
capital attempts to materially reconfigure itself through the crisis of 
climate change, precisely by turning carbon (nature) into a commodity 
through putatively decarbonising capital, complementing observations 
of capitalism’s reconfiguration through a ‘financialisation of nature’ 
deemed to effect nature’s care (for example, Bracking 2012, 2019; 
Sullivan 2012, 2013b). 
These innovations make sense as new layers of the commodification 
processes that have run through capitalism’s history. With good reason 
Jason Moore (2015) calls capital an ecological regime, because it has 
always mixed human labour with nature’s generative capacities so as 
to produce and reproduce natures in specific ways in particular times 
and places. Adopting this perspective, we can see how the battle of 
the twenty-first century is to further transform capital-as-ecology into 
capital-as-climate. Such abstractions involve immense economic, social, 
cultural and environmental forces, constituting a process of fetishisation 
in a Marxian sense, spurred on by the realities of the worsening climate 
in parallel with the profit and rent opportunities that emerge from this 
context for elites. Masked by the appearance of the carbon commodity 
that can be traded, then, are the socio-ecological contexts, calculative 
practices, and relations of exchange that permit a unit of carbon to 
assume a monetary value that can be traded. 
Many environmentalists have become successful entrepreneurs and 
many investors are now riding on the ESG bandwagon. This is what 
capitalism does best. It commodifies, and a new commodity to be formed 
and traded is carbon. This is nothing else but what Marx (1976) called 
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‘commodity fetishism’, the process by which social relations appear as 
commodity relations. Without this most basic of all abstractions, capital 
could not appropriate people and things that exist outside its logic, in 
order to bring them into the workings of the capital machinery. Once 
appropriated, they are exploited either extensively (extending the time 
that capital has to work on its subjects) or intensively (squeezing more 
value from within a given time). And once the basic labour process 
cannot be more optimised and appropriation becomes too costly, 
financialisation kicks in. As Moore rightly argues (2015), capitalism 
is doing all of these three things simultaneously: appropriation, 
commodification and financialisation. ‘Climate capitalism’ is no 
different. It too expands through a unique combination of the exercise 
of state violence, business opportunity and cultural shifting. 
This process of the creation of climate capitalism is not unchallenged 
of course. What the climate debate has shown is that this capitalisation 
process is a struggle of forces within capital and associated social actors 
themselves, as foregrounded in the chapters by Mannan and colleagues, 
North, Paterson and Bond, this volume. It is not something that is 
somehow masterminded by an evil force, placed in Washington, D.C. or 
London or even Beijing. It emerges out of the contradictions of capital, 
the outcomes of which are not predictable.
The latter observation also means that the commodity fetishisation 
of carbon is by no means an inevitable process. Given that capitalist 
processes can only deal with such a grave challenge as climate change 
through new layers of commodification that disenfranchise and 
dispossess people from other modes of production, conditions are also 
created that invite contestation and the expression of different concerns. 
The uneven, unequal and highly volatile process of climate capitalisation, 
which elites try to control, cannot help but engender resistance and 
greater consciousness of justice concerns (as considered in the chapter 
by Harris, this volume). Climate justice is not something that should 
somehow come after an acceptance of climate capitalism. A properly 
just response to climate change can only be brought about if we do not 
shy away from questioning the fundamental logic of carbon fetishism 
and the logic of the market that attempts to appropriate, commodify 
and financialise nature, and ourselves. 
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Purpose and Scope
We intend this book to fill a gap in the climate change debate, which 
is normally dominated by environmental, climate and natural science 
perspectives. This volume instead comprises twenty-eight short 
interventions by prominent social scientists and humanities scholars of 
climate change and societal responses, as well as emerging academic 
contributors and voices from climate activism, bearing in mind that 
these categories are not mutually exclusive. Contributors to the volume 
come from many parts of the world and share their perspectives both on 
what is important in climate change debates, and ‘what is to be done’ in 
terms of radical climate action. 
The collection includes new essays as well as republished texts, 
organised around seven themes: paradigms; what counts?; extraction; 
dispatches from a climate change frontline country; governance; finance; 
and action(s). These themes, which we outline briefly below, emerged 
from our reading of the contributions submitted for the collection, 
rather than being established in advance. They thus seem salient as a 
representation of climate change concerns consolidating amongst social 
science and humanities scholars and activists. 
Paradigms
The first section on Paradigms is comprised of contributions that 
address broad perspectives arising in climate change debates. These 
‘big-picture’ essays introduce some key challenges of the climate crisis 
in terms of societal understanding and response. 
The opening chapter in this section, titled ‘One Earth, Many Futures, 
No Destination’, is by geographer Mike Hulme, whose work is widely 
known for its critical engagement with how climate-change as an idea 
becomes deployed, mobilised and disagreed about in public, scientific 
and policy discourse: most recently in Climate Change: Key Ideas in 
Geography (Hulme 2021). Hulme observes that since the first Earth Day, 
more than half a century ago, it has become clear that it is easier to 
generate scientific insight into the ways human systems and behaviours 
are altering the planet than it is to redirect those human systems to lessen 
the planetary impacts predicted through scientific insight. Alongside 
other chapters in this volume, Hulme thus emphasises the significance 
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of divergent human values for the possibility of making choices that 
redirect human systems such that their planetary impact is transformed. 
The chapter that follows, by Minna Halme and colleagues on the 
Finnish Expert Panel on Sustainable Development, foregrounds how 
the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the vulnerability to crises such 
as climate change caused by a current global socio-economic system 
oriented towards short-term financial efficiency. ‘From Efficiency to 
Resilience: Systemic Change towards Sustainability after the COVID-
19 Pandemic’ argues that sustainability at scale can only be effected 
through a replacement of the dominant efficiency paradigm with a 
resilience paradigm. Their chapter outlines key orientations towards 
sectoral planning and governance they consider necessary for society 
to walk a path that effects systemic transformation towards resilience, 
understood as a mutually supportive symbiosis of social and 
natural—socionatural—‘systems’.
The section on paradigms closes with Sian Sullivan’s chapter ‘On 
Climate Change Ontologies and the Spirit(s) of Oil’, which considers 
ontological dimensions at play in societal understandings of the 
causes and implications of climate change. She asks questions of 
how anthropogenic climate change is understood culturally, and of 
what responses may be promoted as appropriate for this systemic 
predicament. By gesturing to culturally-inflected differences in ways 
of seeing and knowing the world, she draws into focus the interplay 
of multiple realities in climate change understandings that may 
contribute to political disagreements around highly divergent values 
and worldviews.
What Counts?
In considering divergence in climate change understandings and 
responses, our first section leads clearly to the question of What Counts? 
in climate change management, as asked in the essays pursuing this 
second theme of the book. This section addresses issues of calculation 
and measurement, given that climate change debates are often about 
numbers, particularly in relation to emissions of GHG. A key aim of the 
contributions here is to look behind the numbers, providing a rationale 
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for why processes of calculation and measurement should also always 
be seen as political and hence as open to contestation.
James Dyke and co-authors kick off the section with an essay 
provocatively titled ‘Why Net Zero Policies Do More Harm than 
Good’. The policy idea and ideal of ‘net zero carbon’, i.e. that socio-
economic activity should generate zero carbon emissions in aggregate, 
is important for a number of subsequent chapters in this book because 
it has been so definitive in proposing a route towards a ‘solution’ for 
managing CO2 emissions globally. As Dyke and colleagues argue, 
however, ‘net zero’ discourse conceals and justifies the deployment of 
highly speculative technologies that pose ‘fairytales’ in terms of their 
CO2 emissions reductions, whilst also nudging society on to a series of 
potentially dangerous technological pathways for which outcomes are 
unknown. They confirm instead that the only way to keep humanity 
safe is through immediate and sustained radical cuts to greenhouse 
gas emissions, acknowledging the simultaneous challenge of doing this 
in ways that are socially just so as to redress, rather than deepen, the 
inequalities bound up with uneven industrialisation endeavours.
In ‘The Carbon Bootprint of the US Military and Prospects for a Safer 
Climate’, Patrick Bigger and colleagues continue by asking searching 
questions of high-tech responses to CO2 emissions reductions in one of 
the most impactful of global industries, namely the US military. They 
foreground how future military CO2 emissions are locked into the US 
military’s expansive and coupled global logistical networks, hardware, 
and interventionist foreign policy. Echoing Dyke et al.’s chapter, they 
argue that apparently well-intentioned calls to ‘green’ the military are 
insufficient to reign in military emissions, urging that for climate change 
management alone the scope of the US military must be dramatically 
scaled back as part of any serious initiative to maintain a safer climate.
David Durand-Delacre and his team of co-authors shift focus in 
the following chapter to modes of counting and their implications 
when directed towards the understanding and management of human 
dimensions of climate change, specifically human migration linked 
with climate change. ‘Climate Migration is about People, not Numbers’ 
examines the large numbers often invoked to underline alarming climate 
migration narratives, and outlines the serious methodological limitations 
linked with the production of these numbers. In arguing for a greater 
liv Negotiating Climate Change in Crisis
diversity of knowledges of climate migration and emphasising the value 
of qualitative and mixed methods in research, they also question the 
usefulness of excessively inflated numbers to progressive agendas for 
climate action, given the xenophobic fear of climate migration promoted 
by such numbers. In short, they emphasise how decisions based on 
meeting quantitative targets around migration reduction should be 
refocused instead on peoples’ needs, rights and freedoms, and that 
understanding these dimensions of human experience requires a mode 
of listening that does not reduce humans to statistical datapoints alone.
‘We’ll Always Have Paris’ by Mike Hannis turns to the implications of 
the provision for voluntary carbon trading in Article 6 of COP21’s Paris 
Agreement, considering how this can be robustly counted in practice so 
as to ensure the elusive goal of global ‘net zero’ CO2 emissions. Turning a 
sceptical eye to theoretical carbon trading, fantastical Negative Emission 
Technologies (NETs), and voluntary national ‘contributions’, Hannis 
asks questions of how Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
to global CO2 emissions are calculated across the complexities posed by 
voluntary carbon trading possibilities. In placing COP21’s Article 6 in 
the context of the internationalist spirit of 2015 that at least consolidated 
the idea and impression of a globally coordinated effort, he additionally 
asks what impact the resurgent nationalism of the years since may have 
on NDC calculations. Will the new Democrat US presidency be able to 
re-establish US climate leadership and move negotiations back towards 
a position of constructive international engagement on climate issues 
and the NDCs on which emissions reductions rest? How might COP26 
provide a boost to morale in internationalist spirit around climate 
change governance?
Bruce Lankford’s closing chapter in this second section of the book 
considers how CO2 is conceptualised and counted in what he frames 
as ‘The Atmospheric Carbon Commons in Transition’. In his analysis 
Lankford brings to bear the rich concept of “paracommons”, as the 
“commons of material salvages” currently arising from the context 
of climate change crisis requiring that emitted CO2 is systemically 
retrieved or ‘salvaged’. Drawing on analyses of resource commons, he 
argues that the carbon/atmospheric commons can be framed in three 
consecutive stages: a “sink-type atmospheric commons” occurring 
prior to the 1980/90s; a “husbandry-type carbon commons” lasting 
from the 1980/90s to 2030s; and an emergency “carbon paracommons” 
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post-2030s. The first stage sees the atmosphere treated as a dump or 
sink for carbon dioxide (CO2) ‘waste’ resulting in rising CO2 levels. The 
second stage sees climate change mitigation (e.g. carbon sequestration in 
forests) as an Ostromian-commons husbandry that attempts to reduce 
CO2 emission rates but continues to result in levels remaining above 400 
ppm. In the third stage being entered now, the “carbon paracommons” 
treats CO2 and its ‘salvaging’ as a matter of urgency, requiring methods 
of permanent sequestration, non-use and transformation, amidst 
uncertainty as to how in practice these may be instituted and with what 
implications.
Extraction
Given that climate change is caused by the extraction and transformation 
of fossil fuels, the third theme of our book coalesces around Extraction. 
This section is comprised of contributions that critically reflect on our 
uneven addiction to fossil fuel extraction and ask whether the brave new 
world of the nascent renewable energy transition is set to be any more 
sustainable. 
In ‘The Mobilisation of Extractivism: The Social and Political 
Influence of the Fossil Fuel Industry’, Christopher Wright and Daniel 
Nyberg highlight a key paradox: although the worsening climate 
crisis has led to growing social and political demands for meaningful 
climate action and the decarbonisation of economies, the modern global 
economy is defined by fossil fuel energy and its embedded legacy of 
two centuries of economic growth and development. They outline how 
the fossil fuel industry has defined the global economy and defended its 
position as the most powerful industry in the world. This context means 
that assumptions of corporate self-regulation as the logical response to 
the climate crisis will allow for the continuation of a ‘business as usual’ 
approach in which fossil fuel energy is maintained. They argue that an 
emphasis on corporate self-regulation deliberately ignores the urgent 
need for government regulation of carbon emissions. Worse, they 
foreground how current corporate responses to the climate crisis rely on 
a politics of ‘predatory delay’, wherein the fossil fuel industry cynically 
seeks to slow the process of decarbonisation to maximise their financial 
returns in the short term, whilst simultaneously appearing as concerned 
corporate citizens.
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‘End the “Green” Delusions: Industrial-Scale Renewable Energy 
is Fossil Fuel+’, by Alexander Dunlap, matches this concern, arguing 
that industrial-scale renewable energy does little to remake exploitative 
relationships with the earth. In representing the renewal and expansion 
of the present capitalist order, particularly given the fossil fuels 
embedded in the making of these technologies, Dunlap considers 
instead that industrial-scale renewable energy production should 
be more accurately understood as “fossil fuel+”. He urges a radical 
re-thinking of the socio-ecological reality of so-called renewable energy 
so as to create space for the step-change of strategies needed to mitigate 
and avoid climate and ecological catastrophe.
In ‘I’m Sian, and I’m a Fossil Fuel Addict: On Paradox, Disavowal 
and (Im)Possibility in Changing Climate Change’, Sian Sullivan draws 
on research with people who have known lives not determined by 
access to fossil fuels to face the reality of being completely personally 
dependent on fossil fuel extraction and the products made possible 
by fossil fuels. Her essay is an attempt to fully face the contradiction 
between maintaining hope for binding international climate agreements 
that have teeth, whilst being aware of her dependence on the fossil 
fuel extracting and emissions-spewing industrial juggernaut that 
permeates all our lives. Drawing critically on twelve-steps thinking and 
psychoanalytic literature, the chapter constitutes a reflection on fossil 
fuel addiction, highlighting the destructive paradox of not being able to 
live up to internalised but unreachable values regarding environmental 
care in a fossil-fuelled world.
Dispatches from a Climate Change Frontline Country—
Namibia, Southern Africa
The fourth section of the volume changes tack to focus in on dimensions 
of climate change impacts and understanding for a single country 
at great risk of small systemic changes in climate parameters. In 
recognising that climate change debates are dominated and even 
colonised by perspectives from the Global North, Dispatches from 
a Climate Change Frontline Country—Namibia, Southern Africa, 
comprises contributions from and about one country with heightened 
potential vulnerability to small changes in climate due to its status as an 
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arid or semi-arid ‘Global South’ country. These chapters are set against 
the background of amplified risk of climate change posed by present 
oil exploration in Namibia’s north-east Kavango Region, bordering 
Botswana, and current frenzied excitement within the oil industry that 
Namibia might “become the biggest oil story of the decade” (Leigh 2021), 
although the essays here do not explicitly address this rapidly shifting 
situation. The section builds on long-term research collaborations in 
Namibia by one of us (Sullivan).8
Selma Lendelvo and colleagues in the opening chapter for this 
section draw attention to a specific set of climate change-related 
interactions that pose particular implications for women in some 
rural areas of Namibia. ‘Gendered Climate Change-Induced Human-
Wildlife Conflicts amidst COVID-19 in Erongo Region, Namibia’ argues 
that the risks of climate change for drier countries have become more 
pronounced, with small increments in temperature changes considered 
to pose serious consequences for dry countries such as Namibia and 
neighbouring Botswana, both of which have experienced significant 
and sustained drought in recent years. Lendelvo and co-authors draw 
attention to one effect of such changes, namely the amplified intensity of 
interactions between people and wildlife, such as elephants, as drought 
in the drylands of west Namibia concentrates humans and wildlife 
around available water sources. They focus on some of the particular 
implications for women as a vulnerable social group that is bearing 
the brunt of climate change-induced ‘human-wildlife conflict’, and 
foreground how women here are adjusting to these pressures. In closing, 
Lendelvo and colleagues ask us to remember that climate change impacts 
are differentiated and that the most vulnerable social groups—women, 
the poor and others—tend not to be present at international round-table 
discussions such as COPs to share their experiences of dealing and living 
with the impacts of climate change in their daily lives. Their chapter is 
intended as a short communiqué to foreground the types of concerns 
8  We gratefully acknowledge here two research grants that have supported this 
international collaboration with Namibian researchers and contexts: Future Pasts 
(www.futurepasts.net, supported by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC), and Etosha-Kunene Histories (www.etosha-kunene-histories.
net) supported by the AHRC and the German Research Foundation (DFG).
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women in rural dryland communities might wish to voice if they were 
able to be present at COP26.
Rick Rohde and colleagues follow with ‘Environmental Change in 
Namibia: Land-Use Impacts and Climate Change as Revealed by Repeat 
Photography’, a chapter that draws attention to a specific environmental 
history methodology for understanding environmental change within 
a recent historical timeline. They demonstrate how repeat landscape 
photography can be used to explore and juxtapose different cultural and 
scientific understandings of environmental change and sustainability in 
west Namibia. Change in the landscape ecology of western and central 
Namibia over the last 140 years has been investigated using archival 
landscape photographs located and re-photographed or ‘matched’ with 
recent photographs. Each set of matched images for a site provides a 
powerful visual statement of change and/or stability that can assist 
with understanding present circumstances in specific places. Sometimes 
these image sets show trajectories of vegetation change that diverge 
from modelled climate change projections and scenarios, demonstrating 
the importance of drawing on multiple sources of information to 
contextualise, and perhaps complexify, projected and predicted 
environmental futures.
In ‘On Climate and the Risk of Onto-Epistemological Chainsaw 
Massacres: A Study on Climate Change and Indigenous People in 
Namibia Revisited’, Ute Dieckmann asks searching questions of what 
may be lost in the process of trying to translate indigenous environmental 
knowledges and experiences into internationally acknowledged scientific 
frameworks. She revisits a commissioned World Bank Trust Fund study 
on climate change and indigenous people in Namibia in which she was 
involved, to highlight the predicament of short-term ‘participatory’ 
research with indigenous communities on climate change, and the 
ways in which imposed conceptual frameworks may act to subordinate 
indigenous peoples’ ontologies to ‘western’ ontologies. She reflects that 
the ‘compartmentalising’ necessitated by such a methodology risks 
losing the most important aspects of indigenous ecological knowledge 
related to climate change, thereby perpetuating both climate and 
epistemic injustices.
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Governance
The fifth theme on Governance steps back into a ‘wide-angle’ view, 
emphasising that the failure to address global climate change so far has 
been a failure of governance at global and national levels. Contributions 
in this section reflect on this governance failure and outline a series of 
practical solutions for moving forwards, beyond COP26.
The section opens with ‘Towards a Fossil Fuel Treaty’ by Peter 
Newell, a clarion call for a new approach for tackling climate change 
that focuses explicitly on fossil fuels. Like Wright and Nyberg, Newell 
also highlights the power of fossil fuel lobbies to delay effective climate 
action, urging that it is time to reign in the power these actors have over 
our collective fate, through international agreements and laws which 
effectively and fairly leave large swathes of remaining fossil fuels in 
the ground. He proposes a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT) 
based, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the three pillars of 
non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use, as an instrument of 
international governance that could fulfil this purpose.
In ‘How Governments React to Climate Change: An Interview 
with the Political Theorists Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann’ by Isaac 
Chotiner, we republish an interview with leading theorists of climate 
change governance that considers how to approach the global politics 
of climate change. Their conversation foregrounds several different 
potential futures for our warming planet. They argue that a more 
forceful international order, or “Climate Leviathan”, is emerging, but 
warn that this configuration remains unlikely to mitigate catastrophic 
warming.
‘Inside Out COPs: Turning Climate Negotiations Upside Down’ 
by Shahrin Mannan and colleagues highlights the complexities of 
negotiations by the Conference of Parties (COP), observing that COP25, 
the longest in history, did not achieve its intended outcomes. Government 
negotiators failed to agree on core issues meaning that implementation 
of the Paris Agreement (COP21) has been pushed further away. COP 
negotiations tend to be dragged into overtime and appear inefficient, 
a perspective not helped by the arcane language of the adopted texts. 
The chapter advocates for the entire negotiating process to be rethought: 
through the alternative concept of ‘inside out’ COPs, wherein actions 
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on the ground to implement the Paris Agreement are given greater 
prominence than political negotiations around a patchwork of 
compromises for implementation. They affirm that many different 
actors, including civil society, private companies, cities, universities, 
indigenous communities, young people and others pressing for action, 
should be placed centre-stage in devising and delivering outcomes that 
may be more real than those spun in COP Agreement texts run through 
with constructed ambiguities.
Shifting towards governance by national governments, in ‘Local 
Net Zero Emissions Plans: How Can National Governments Help?’ Ian 
Bailey clarifies the support needed from national governments in order 
that local government bodies can act on urban and regional initiatives 
that catalyse capacity building, knowledge exchange, and practical 
action on climate change and other sustainability issues. Bailey affirms 
that while local government initiatives equally should not be viewed 
as a substitute for robust international and national action on climate 
change, they can provide important arenas for mobilising local actors, 
formulating policies and developing institutions to complement national 
strategies. This chapter examines three main areas where support from 
central governments for local climate change responses is needed: the 
creation of supportive national policy environments; ensuring local 
governments are enabled to exercise their delegated powers to influence 
emissions; and the provision of finance to support emissions-reduction 
activities.
In the final chapter for this section on governance, Paul Harris 
foregrounds relationships between global climate governance and 
climate justice. ‘Reversing the Failures of Climate Governance: Radical 
Action for Climate Justice’ again recognises that global governance of 
climate change has failed. Emissions of the greenhouse gas pollution 
that causes climate change are still increasing globally, and little has been 
done to help the most vulnerable communities adapt to the inevitable, 
potentially existential, impacts. Harris argues that radical action is 
needed to avert and cope with the most dangerous consequences of 
climate change but will require focused attention on identifying the most 
vital sources of failure in climate governance and overcoming them. He 
suggests that much, if not most, of the failure of climate governance 
can be attributed to a lack of multiple kinds of climate justice—a lack 
of ecological and environmental justice, a lack of social and distributive 
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justice, and a lack of international and global justice—and that averting 
climate catastrophe will require governance practices that embrace and 
implement all forms of climate justice.
Finance
Extending the theme of governance, our sixth section on Finance 
consists of two incisive essays regarding the complex roles of finance 
in climate change governance. Financing climate change mitigation and 
adaptation will be arguably a much bigger undertaking than what has 
been witnessed so far in terms of the global response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The financial resources needed to combat climate change are 
considered to be immense and the climate finance industry has been 
growing steadily over the past twenty years. As clarified by the chapters 
in this section, however, this growth does not in itself demonstrate 
success in terms of climate change management. The question of how 
to design and institute sustainable climate finance futures that are also 
equitable remains. Is it possible to do this in a capitalist global economy 
that tends towards the concentration of financial(ised) assets, and the 
fetishised concealment of multiple contradictions?
Sarah Bracking’s opening chapter in this section grapples head-on 
with these contradictions. ‘Climate Finance and the Promise of Fake 
Solutions to Climate Change’ illuminates how promises of money from 
global institutions and governments have financialised people’s hopes 
and expectations of government action to adapt to climate change 
and slow the emission of greenhouse gases. Bracking asserts that the 
cultural power of money in our understanding of the world means that 
climate finance has had the particular effect of signifying action while 
delivering very little. She argues that moving forwards with the actual 
material changes to energy, infrastructure, production and income 
distribution lying at the heart of an effective response to climate change 
will require acceptance that largely fictional promises of money that 
“can change things” are a phantasmagorical expression of meaning 
acting as a “firewall” that prevents real change. The essay traces the 
small disbursement figures for the main pots of climate finance. In 
doing so, Bracking offers a stringent critique of the obfuscating power of 
the language of finance and its propositions in the financing of climate 
change governance.
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Rami Kaplan and David Levy’s chapter on ‘The Promise and Peril 
of Financialised Climate Governance’ emphasises the rise of investor-
driven, “financialised governance” of corporate practices in relation 
to the natural environment. Investors and investment managers are 
demonstrating greater concern that the value of assets, from stock 
markets to real estate, is increasingly subject to climate risks. Financialised 
climate governance (FCG) puts investors and fund managers at the 
centre of efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, which suggests both 
the promise and peril of this advanced form of “climate capitalism”. 
They describe these developments and point towards the peril that 
relying on investors and business self-interest is unlikely to result in the 
rapid structural shifts needed for full decarbonisation.
Action(s)
The volume’s final section on Action(s) extends the practical and 
affirmative suggestions made elsewhere in the book to foreground 
specific proposals for negotiating responses that are both effective and 
equitable in addressing and averting the climate crisis.
Peter North’s opening question ‘What Is to Be Done to Save the 
Planet?’ is a good place to start. The essay reviews the impacts of 
radical social movement activity on the climate based on observations 
over the past fifteen years or so. It considers experiences of grassroots 
prefiguration and experimentation such as transition initiatives, 
experiments for eco-localisation, and small business networks, 
contrasting these initiatives with more antagonistic, direct, action-based 
movements such as the climate camps, mobilisations around the COPs 
and Extinction Rebellion. The intervention concludes by discussing the 
perceived efficacy of these varied movements, suggesting a need for 
more strategic action to effect system change via a ‘Green New Deal’.
In ‘Climate Politics between Conflict and Complexity’, Matthew 
Paterson similarly foregrounds how climate politics needs both 
moments of sharp, highly politicising, even over-simplifying moves 
to keep pressure up, but at the same time a sort of patient, careful 
attention to the complexity of socio-technical systems to work out how 
to generate radical shifts in infrastructure and practice. He observes 
that these different logics are in tension: the post-political/agonistic 
logic can reduce to slogans and deflect from how society may become 
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decarbonised in practical terms; the observance of how to effect change 
through complex socio-technical systems can culminate in technocratic 
projects. Paterson’s chapter navigates the question of how to keep both 
these logics and their affirmative engagements alive in political praxis 
linked with climate change.
Rebecca Sandover’s chapter on ‘Sustainable Foodscapes: Hybrid Food 
Networks Creating Food Change’ connects food production practices 
specifically with climate change governance, asserting that food matters, 
from modes of production to global supply chains, to what we eat and 
how we address food waste. Considering that Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU) activities account for some 21–37% of total 
net anthropogenic GHG emissions it is clear that food practices shape 
not only climate and ecological breakdown but also human health and 
well-being including within our food producing communities, and in 
issues associated with unequal access to food, food justice and animal 
welfare. Sandover’s chapter foregrounds in particular how place-based 
community groups have been self-organising and connecting with 
different national organisations whose campaigns overlap to form 
hybrid food networks, in the midst of a present food policy vacuum in 
England. It explores the dynamic potential of these hybrid networks in 
working towards place-based sustainable food solutions through a case 
study of Devon.
In ‘Telling the “Truth”: Communication of the Climate Protest 
Agenda in the UK Legacy Media’, Sharon Gardham draws on the results 
of a thematic discourse analysis of UK media coverage of climate strike 
actions that took place in 2019, reflecting on the importance for the wider 
adoption of climate protest messages of how protester claims-making 
and identity are framed. Gardham’s chapter revisits a key question 
for the organisers of such protests regarding how they can overcome 
the potential conflict between ensuring their actions pass the test of 
newsworthiness required to ensure media attention, without failing the 
tests of claims-making legitimisation necessary for an issue to become 
accepted as a societal problem that requires urgent resolution.
Picking up themes considered elsewhere in the volume regarding 
climate justice, Patrick Bond, in ‘Climate Justice Advocacy: Strategic 
choices for Glasgow and Beyond’, urges “non-reformist reforms” in 
climate action. He critiques the lack of ambition and action in the main 
UN processes, but also critically analyses the ‘Glasgow Agreement’ 
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promoted by leading civil society activist groups. Drawing parallels 
with South Africa’s resistance strategies to defeat apartheid, he calls for 
climate justice movements to similarly not cave in to the internal logic of 
the climate governance system, instead confronting its core dynamics by 
delegitimising the system of oppression on which it is overlain. What we 
need, instead, he argues, is to give confidence to critical ideas and social 
forces that can question climate capitalism wholesale. 
In the penultimate chapter of the book, Lorraine Whitmarsh reviews 
‘Public Engagement with Radical Climate Change Action’, arguing that 
it is a mistake to understand people’s role only in terms of their actions 
as consumers of apparently low-carbon products and urging that it is 
critical that people are also engaged as political, social and professional 
actors to achieve the scale of societal transformation needed. Whitmarsh 
discusses the varied roles the public can play in decision-making 
and in taking rapid and radical climate action, their current levels of 
engagement with climate change, and how to foster further public 
action. She lands her chapter on a positive note: affirming that we have 
a unique opportunity now to build back society post-COVID-19 in a 
way that might lock in low-carbon habits created during the pandemic, 
and that builds on the growing social mandate for bold policy action to 
support sustainable lifestyles.
We close this collection with a republished intervention by artist-
activists Isabelle Fremeaux and Jay Jordan. Their text clarifies––with 
poetic and gritty integrity––their choice to publicly refuse participation 
in an event (Agir Pour le Vivant / Action for the Living, in Arles in France, 
August 2020) on the grounds of the dissonance between the event’s 
intentions and its sponsorship by a series of fossil fuel extractors and 
financiers. ‘Five Questions whilst Walking’ invites consideration of the 
sorts of choices that need to be made if we are collectively to walk away 
from the forces propelling global climate crisis.
***
Clearly, no book could be completely comprehensive regarding climate 
change, the multifaceted challenges it poses, and societal responses to 
these challenges. This book is rather posed as an intervention, collecting 
together indicative contributions regarding what social scientists, 
humanities scholars and climate activists around the world think needs 
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to be done in terms of both understanding why climate action has failed 
to dramatically reduce emissions to date, and proposing some routes 
towards radical climate change action now. That is, the book is intended 
to provide an affirmative set of ideas about what is to be done and how 
it can be done, to bring about radical climate change governance so that 
we have a chance of avoiding runaway climate change.
We are publishing this collection of essays in the months leading 
up to the high-profile and eagerly awaited COP26 UN climate change 
conference, due to take place in Glasgow (Scotland, UK) in November 
2021. At this conference, all the major stakeholders of the global climate 
change negotiation process will be present, including heads of state, 
large national government delegations, policy advisers, NGO and social 
movement activists, multinational corporations, industry associations, 
and inter-governmental institutions. There will be significant media 
interest in COP26, reaching millions of people around the world, linked, 
for example, with the re-entering of the agreement by the US, the newly 
entwined crises of COVID-19 and climate change, and negotiations 
around the form and content of Green New Deal proposals. We hope 
that this collection of essays will contribute to this discussion. 
Despite more than thirty years of high-level, global talks on climate 
change, we are still seeing emissions rising dramatically around the 
world. Whatever we have done on this planet in terms of climate 
mitigation over the past thirty plus years has not worked. Given that 
most climate scientists believe we are soon running out of time, the 
authors contributing to this volume ask what has gone wrong and what 
now needs to be done. We hope the essays collated here will help us 
move more radically and urgently in the direction needed.
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